A piloted flight simulator experiment has been conducted to evaluate issues related to the display of microburst alerts on electronic cockpit instrumentation. Issues addressed include display clarity, usefulness of multi-level microburst intensity information, and whether information from multiple sensors should be presented separately or "fused" into combined alerts. Nine active airline pilots of"glass-cockpit" aircraft participated in the study. Microburst alerts presented on a moving map display were found to be visually clear and useful to pilots. Also, multi-level intensity information coded by colors or patterns was found to be important for decision-making purposes.
Abstract
A piloted flight simulator experiment has been conducted to evaluate issues related to the display of microburst alerts on electronic cockpit instrumentation. Issues addressed include display clarity, usefulness of multi-level microburst intensity information, and whether information from multiple sensors should be presented separately or "fused" into combined alerts. Nine active airline pilots of"glass-cockpit" aircraft participated in the study. Microburst alerts presented on a moving map display were found to be visually clear and useful to pilots. Also, multi-level intensity information coded by colors or patterns was found to be important for decision-making purposes.
Pilot opinion was mixed on whether to "fuse" data from multiple sensors, and some resulting design tradeoffs have been identified. The positional information included in the graphical alert presentation was found useful by the pilots for planning lateral missed approach maneuver, but may result in deviations which could interfere with normal airport operations. A number of flight crew training issues were also identified. List of Tables   Table 1.   Table 2 . 
2.

Objectives of Experiment
The experiment concentrated on displaying microburst alerts, assumed to be generated by ..... 
Microburst Display Formats
Three prototype microburst alert formats were designed to evaluate the issues listed above, Display A showed "fused" alerts based on a combination of all of the available sensor data, A single intensity threshold was applied in order to identify "hazardous" microbursts. These were then displayed as flashing solid red circles on the EHSI. The hazard threshold was based on the "F-factor" microburst hazard criterion* averaged over one-half mile; when this value exceeded 0.1, an alert was issued. The F-factor criterion was used to set alert thresholds, rather than maximum velocity change as currently used in the TDWR system, because previous work has demonstrated that F-factor averaged over this distance correlates better with the impact of a microburst on an aircraft trajectory than maximum velocity change does) was designed to evaluate the need for intensity information. It is a three-level display, also based on F-factor averaged over one-half nautical mile. A description of the level structure is given in Table 1 . A level 1 microburst was displayed as a flashing hollow red circle, a level 2 microburst was displayed as a flashing solid red circle, and a level 3 microburst was * F-factor is a hazard criterion, including both headwind loss and downdraft components, which indicates the instantaneous loss of aircraft available climb rate due to the immediate windfield. It is described in more detail in references 3, 7, and 8. 
Scenario Design
A total of 12 approach scenarios were run with each pilot subject. These were chosen to evaluate the reaction of the pilot under differing conditions to the three displays, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to stimulate commentary for the exit questionnaire. There were three independent variables in the experimental matrix:
Presence/Absence of heavy precipitation ("wet" or "dry" microburst conditions)
.
Threatening situation (hazaa'dous microburst present on approach path) or non-threatening situation (No hazardous microbursts within 1.5 nm of approach).
The precipitation (radar reflectivity) patterns for the "wet" and "dry" cases were chosen to be loosely representative of "typical" microburst events as described in the literature. 4.5 In wet cases, thunderstorms were present in close proximity to the airport, with microbursts occurring either in the center or on the edge of high-reflectivity regions; in dry cases, only light precipitation was present in the vicinity of the airport.
The "threatening" and "non-threatening" cases were chosen to stimulate commentary on the operational use of the alerts. In the "threatening" case, hazardous microburst alerts (level 2 or 3) appeared directly on the flight path, and in the "non-threatening" case hazardous microburst alerts occurred at a lateral distance of 1.5 to 2 nm from the flight path. "Non-threatening" in this case does not presuppose that the pilot should make the approach if a microburst is present 1.5 nm laterally displaced from the flight path; it only indicates that, under the current TDWR alert methodology, no alert would be issued. 6 In both cases, microburst icons began to appear when the aircraft approached to within 12-15 nm of the airport, and grew from level 1 to level 2 or 3 events before the aircraft reached the outer marker.
The nominal test matrix is shown in 
Experimental Procedure
The experiment began with an explanation to the subject of the purpose of both the microburst alert and terrain depiction studies. This included a brief discussion of the state of the art in microburst detection and digital datalink, as well as the explanation of F-factor described in Section 3.3 above.
The three display types were demonstrated and explained. Next, the pilot was given a practice run with the simulator to familiarize himself with the autopilot system, displays, and display controls.
The 12 scenarios were then run in two groups of 6, with a break between the groups. At the beginning of each run, the pilot was provided with an approach plate and the ATIS* message, and given as much time as needed to study them. During each run, one of the exp,;rimenters acted as the air traffic controller, and communicated with the pilot via a wireless headset. The controls and displays were videotaped, and the appropriate numerical data was recorded in binary format by the simulation computer. After the 12 runs, an exit questionnaire (Appendix A) was conducted in order to obtain comments and numerical rankings of the displays and their features. The experiment required approximately 3 hours per subject to complete.
Subject Selection
All of the subjects for this experiment were active line pilots currently flying "glasscockpit" aircraft (Boeing 757-767, MD-88). Nine subjects participated, and all were males between the ages of 36 and 51. Three of the pilots were captains, and six were first officers.
subjects averaged 5890 hours of total flight experience, and averaged 1130 hours of flight experience on EFIS/FMC-equipped aircraft.
Results and Discussion
The 4.1 Visual Clarity of Alerts on EHS!
The easiest issue to address was the visual clarity of the alerts when displayed on the EHSI.
In the exit questionnaire, the pilots were asked to rate the three displays individually for visual clarity on a scale from 1 ("very difficult to read") to 4 ("very easy to read"). The results
were almost identical for all three displays; all were rated easy or very easy to read, with average ratings between 3.5 and 4. In the final approach situation, the pilots almost always set the EHSI to the minimum range (5 nm) with airports, navaids, and off-route waypoints suppressed, so the microburst alerts were by far the most prominent features on the display.
Overall Display Ratings
The numerical preference rankings from the survey give the best idea of the general acceptability of the three display formats. In this question, the subjects were asked to rank the three displays (A, B, and C) by order of preference from 1 (most preferable) to 3 (least preferable).
The three level display (B) was ranked highest on average, followed by the discrete display (C) second, and display A last (Table 3) . Although several of the pilots remarked on the need for simple and easy to comprehend displays, display A was never ranked the best. This may indicate that it does not contain enough information. Several pilots contended that they would like to see a display with both multiple intensity levels and information separated by source, although no suggestions about how this would be implemented were offered. 
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Figure5 showstheaveraged responses to a questionwhich askedthe pilotsto rank the threeformatsindividually from 1 to 4 in terms of how useful they are to understanding the weather situation.
A response of 1 indicated "not at all useful," while 4 indicated "very useful." The data indicates that display B was thought to be most useful, followed by display C. This is consistent with the overall preference ranking discussed above. It is also important to note that all of the average rankings exceeded 3, which indicates that all of the displays were considered generally useful.
Specific Display Features
Three questions were also asked with regard to specific features of the displays (Table 4 ).
These questions asked the subjects to rank the need for a particular feature, from 1 ("unnecessary") to 4 ("essential"). The concept of displaying three levels of intensity (as in display B) rather than the single level alert (as in display A) was strongly supported, with an average rating of 3.167. In all cases, this feature was rated between 3 and 4. The numerical F-factor display feature was ranked significantly lower (2.222), and the large standard deviation indicates the large spread of responses on this question. Four of the subjects ranked this feature "unnecessary". A similar set of responses was received for the need to know the source of the information (display C). Again, although the average was near middle scale, the responses were strongly split between the ends of the scale. The reasons for the split responses on the latter two items were apparent from pilot comments, and will be discussed later. microburst located a given distance to one side of the approach track appears to be considered an equivalent threat (for decision-making purposes) to a level 2 microburst located closer to the approach track. The reasons for this were not clear from pilot comments; such a perception might be due to either lack of confidence in the position accuracy of the sensing system, or to the possibility that a microburst may move closer to the flight path. One of the subjects also stated that having multiple intensity levels made the alerts more compelling, and induced closer study of the situation (as compared to a single-level format).
There was no consensus on the use of numerical F-factor values, however. One pilot indicated that the numbers would be distracting, and that he didn't want to take the time to decipher that information; color-coded information is much easier to interpret. Another said that more levels might be desirable, but that the F-factor numbers required too much thought; perhaps a scale from 1 to 10 might be better. As stated above, a total of 4 subjects rated the F-factor numbers as unnecessary. However, several did rate them highly in terms of need, and one pilot actually preferred the numbers to the three-level intensity arrangement (due to the finer intensity resolution available). In general, the performance implication of the F-factor numbers was understood, and was found to be a good justification for the thresholds used in the alerting schemes, but no consensus was reached as to their usefulness in real-time situations.
The responses with regard to the "discrete" alert format used in Display C were also polarized. Several pilots reacted positively to the separated alerts due to the "reinforcing" aspect;
they found it useful to know when the airborne sensor confirmed the ground-based report. 
Procedural Implications of Graphical Alerts
In the cases where a hazardous microburst was present directly on the approach track, it is interesting to examine the point in time where the pilot stopped monitoring the developing microburst situation and initiated a missed approach. The remaining distance between the aircraft and the nearest microburst icon on the approach track ( Figure 6 ) was defined as the "decision distance". This distance was tabulated for all applicable cases (36 total runs), and had a mean value of 4.26 nm with a relatively low standard deviation of 1.15 nm. This result is potentially
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Aircraft Symbol Figure  6 . Definition of decision distance. The distance marked "d" (from the aircraft symbol to the nearest microburst icon on the approach track) at the time of go-around is referred to as "decision distance". usefulfor helpingdefinecrewresponse procedures for thesealerts. It alsoemphasizes the importance of having a reliable ground-based detection and uplink capability, since most of the pilots made their decision at roughly the design limit range of some of the airborne sensors currently under development. 7 It should be noted that, in this experiment, microbursts which occurred directly on the approach track were always located between 1 and 3 nautical miles from the runway threshold.
Several other implications of using graphical alerts were identified from experimental observations. One of these was the fact that the pilots typically asked for a turn when requesting a missed approach. In some cases, the pilot informed the tower well in advance (sometimes before the aircraft had reached the outer marker) which direction he would like to turn in the case of a missed approach. Several subjects indicated that positional information (which allowed this kind of missed approach planning) was the best feature of a graphical presentation.
The other side of this issue was that in none of the cases did the pilots seem to consider a straight-ahead missed approach as an option. In one case, a pilot requested a turn to avoid a microburst which took the aircraft directly through a high reflectivity thunderstorm core indicated by the weather radar. A straight ahead missed approach, since the aircraft was still several miles from the microburst, would have resulted in passage through the microburst region (where there was little precipitation indicated) at approximately 20(10 feet AGL with a positive climb rate well established, The hazard involved in the straight ahead missed approach in this case was low, and probably less than that involved in making the turn into the storm. Another pilot commented that, if the controller insisted on a straight 'ahead missed approach which took the aircraft through the microburst alert, he (the pilot) would exercise his authority to make an emergency deviation.
Behavior of this type could significantly impact airport operations. These events underline the need for training and for definition of a recommended set of procedures, since studies show that turns to avoid microbursts are not required given early initiation of a go-around. 8
A connected issue relates to display of low intensity or less hazardous microburst alerts.
Although none of the scenarios were explicitly designed to test this issue, it was apparent from several of the pilots' comments and actions that having a graphical alert of any magnitude on or very near the approach was grounds for a go-around. Some comments suggested that this was due to two possible reasons: 1) microbursts were observed to change in intensity fairly quickly, and 2)
if anythbzg is reported on the flight path, and the aircraft experiences any turbulence or wind shear or whatever, then the pilot may appear negligent for proceeding with the approach with an alert present. In view of this latter possibility, it is possible that any graphical alert no matter how low in intensity which is located on the approach or departure track will induce the pilot to abort, if not for safetythanfor legalreasons.In anycase,it is apparent thatthe lowestalertthresholdmustbe very carefullysetin orderto balance safetyvs.operational efficiency,andthatthereis a needfor established guidelinesfor reactionto forward-lookairborneor uplinkedground-based wind shear alerts. It must"also be considered that such behavior may have been an artifact of the simulation environment. This high level of caution is in sharp contrast to the verbal alerts issued during recent TDWR operational evaluations; low intensity "wind-shear-with-loss" alerts do not require that a missed approach be made, and pilots have been observed to continue approaches during microburst alerts of fairly high intensity. 9._°S ince some of the scenarios forced the pilots to make a decision about microbursts which occurred 1.5 to 2 nm from the approach, it was possible to ask the question "how close can a hazardous microburst icon come to the approach path before you will decide not to make the approach?" The answers varied widely; six of the subjects were able to give a quantitative distance (based on a "'hazardous" microburst alert as shown in display A). These ranged from 2 nm up to 15 nm, with a mean of about 5 nm; four of the six who answered this question gave distances of 2 and 3 nm. In contrast, the current TDWR alerting methodology only gives an alert if some part of the microburst shape comes within one-half nm of the approach, and even with this criterion "nuisance alerts" occur, t._ This seems to imply that the positional information contained in the graphical alert could have a strong positive effect on pilot confidence in the alerting system. If the pilot makes an approach when a microburst alert is given 1 or 2 nm from the approach path, and experiences no wind shear, the graphical alert allows him to see that he has not actually penetrated the center of the microburst region.
Under the current verbal alerting system, the pilot treats such a situation as a false alarm and may lose confidence in the alerting system; he or she has no way of knowing that the microburst does exist, but is displaced to one side of the approach.
One of the issues explicitly tested was the sensitivity of pilot decision-making to varying precipitation levels. No significant differences in pilot response were observed between "wet" and "dry" microburst situations.
In one case, when microbursts appeared under very light rain conditions, a pilot commented that "that shouldn't be there," but in no cases did a pilot simply ignore an alert because of light precipitation. In reality, when "dry" microbursts are present, other visual clues (virga, dust rings, etc.) would likely be present which could not be simulated with the existing simulator facility. Several pilots did remark that they were more aware of and concerned about the wind shear threat under thunderstorm conditions.
5.
Conclusions
Display Format Issues
Several useful results were obtained with respect to the display format issues listed in Section 2. Overwhelmingly, the pilots found presentation of microburst alerts on the EHSI to be clear and effective. Also, use of multiple intensity levels was strongly supported, and several different reasons were given in pilot comments. These were: (1) a multiple-level presentation is more visually compelling than a single-level one, (2) simple intensity trend information is present in the multi-level presentation, and (3) "more caution" can be taken (i.e. maintain a larger distance from the event) when very intense microbursts are detected. It was apparent from experimental observations that the individual pilots had different ways of making decisions about the wind shear threats presented to them, and that the multi-level display seemed to allow them to more easily and confidently make those decisions. Based on these results, it is recommended that alerts should contain multiple intensity levels coded by icon colors or patterns rather than numbers.
Use of F-factor as an ',den level threshold seems to work well. It relates closely to aircraft performance, and is thus a good indicator of the aviation hazard posed by a microburst; it was also easy to explain to the pilots in terms of loss in available climb performance. Determination of the actual values to be used for the alert thresholds requires further study.
The issue of whether to present "fused" or "di_rete" microburst information was not completely resolved. Some pilots felt that there was absolutely no need to know where the alert comes from, because it would not change their actions to know how the microburst was detected.
Others found it useful to know when the airborne sensor confirmed the ground-based report, and in one case the pilot indicated that he would not need verbal confirmation of the alert from the tower if both sensors were reporting the same information. In no cases did it .seem critical to the pilot's decision making process to know where the alert was coming from, since it was assumed that all of the alerts issued were accurate. This would likely be assumed in practice as well, since microbursts can pose a strong threat. Thus, the improved accuracy available through data fusion must be weighed against the 'added confidence gained by the pilot when he is aware of reinforcing data from different sensors. This issue requires further consideration.
The effect of precipitation (radar reflectivity) on the believability of the microburst alerts was found in this experiment to be negligible. The pilots in all cases gave the microburst alerts 100% credence regardless of the intensity or proximity of the precipitation present.
In an actual flight situation,this may bedifferentbecause of thepresence of extemalvisualcues,particularlyin "dry" microburstconditions.
Procedural Implications of Graphical Alerting
Several procedural implications of displaying graphical alerts were
The positional information inherent in the graphical alert was well received almost all cases 'allowed them to plan and request a missed approach which observed in this study.
by the pilots, and in took them clear of the event. Also, it was observed that the subjects made the decision to execute a missed approach when the aircraft was an average of 4.26 nm from the microburst. Another interesting observation was that the pilots were generally not willing to execute the approach when microburst icons were present within several miles of the approach track. This is inconsistent with the current TDWR alert methodology, in which microbursts which lie greater than one-half nm from the approach do not trigger any alerts. However, it is likely that knowledge of the location of the microburst would have a beneficial effect on pilot confidence in the alerting system. During recent TDWR evaluations, situations often occurred in which an alert was issued, but the aircraft did not actually encounter the microburst due to lateral displacement of the microburst from the flight path. The positional information contained in the graphical format would clarify this situation, and prevent the pilot from perceiving the alert as a false alarm.
Flight Crew Training Issues
Implementation of this system will require some pilot training in microburst meteorology, the impact of microbursts on aircraft performance, and the specific meaning of the alert structure which will be used. Several events which occurred during the experiment indicated that such training is required. For example, in none of the cases did the pilots seem to consider a straightahead missed approach as an option, even when the decision to abort the approach was made 5 to 10 nm from the microburst location. In one case, the pilot indicated that he would make an emergency deviation if the controller insisted on a straight-ahead missed approach. It needs to be emphasized that microbursts pose a danger primarily at low "altitudes to slow-moving aircraft, and that a straight-ahead missed approach is acceptable if initiated early enough.
A related issue was raised by the lateral separation question, where the pilots were asked how close a microburst icon could be laterally to the approach path such that they would still make the approach (see Section 4.4). Responses of 2-3 nm are understandable, since the accuracy of the alert is to some degree unknown, and the possibility exists that other microbursts will appear in the same regions. .
In display A, information from multiple windshear sensors was combined to form "fused" alerts.
In display C information from different sensors was displayed individually (thus including the _ of the info) and the pilot must form a combined picture of the situation. Given that all sensors are equally reliable and accurate, would you say that knowledge of the origin of the information is: How far away from a hazardous microburst would you consider to be the "decision distance,"
i.e. how close will you get before you stop waiting for the situation to develop and decide whether or not to make a missed approach? o Please rank the three display formats individually for visual clarity, i.e. how easy it was to pick the alert information out on the EHSI. 
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